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THE (IL)LEGITIMACY OF 
BANKRUPTCIES FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF SECURED CREDITORS 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr.∗ 
The desirability of secured creditor bankruptcies is undoubtedly 
a polarized issue. On one hand, some argue that secured creditor 
bankruptcies should be dismissed outright. On the other, others assert 
that secured creditor bankruptcies should not be automatically dis-
missed because they can be beneficial in certain circumstances. This 
Article explores this tension by initializing a dialog between the advo-
cates and the critics of secured creditor bankruptcies. Through this 
dialectic approach, this Article concludes that, even though secured 
creditor bankruptcies may have the capacity for mischief, they should 
still be permitted so long as they are governed by carefully drawn lim-
itations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This Article explores the legitimacy—or illegitimacy—of filing and 
maintaining a case under the Bankruptcy Code1 when the sole or princi-
pal beneficiary or beneficiaries of the case would be a secured creditor or 
secured creditors.2 In the situation posited here, the application of the 
usual distributional priority rules would not produce any distribution for 
the general, unsecured creditors of the debtor. In the prototypical case 
virtually all of the assets of the debtor would be subject to secured claims 
securing obligations that exceed the value of the collateral, i.e., the se-
cured creditor would be undersecured and there would be no equity in 
the collateral for the benefit of the debtor’s estate. I refer here to such a 
bankruptcy case as a “secured creditor bankruptcy.” 
I note at the outset that this project originally was conceived as a 
joint effort with Professor Bruce A. Markell.3 Sadly, scheduling issues 
eventually prevented our formal collaboration.4 While I assume full re-
sponsibility for the final product, I am indebted to Professor Markell for 
his enormously helpful input. Professor Markell and I have differing 
views on how bankruptcy law should deal with secured party bankrupt-
cies.5 My views generally fall into the legitimacy side of the argument and 
Professor Markell’s on the other side. Although my goal here is to set out 
the best policy arguments on each side, I have no doubt that Professor 
Markell would have provided a more cogent and articulate account of 
the illegitimacy point of view than I have managed to offer. 
Following this Introduction, Part II of this Article offers a brief 
overview of several bankruptcy-law-related settings and contexts in 
which the appropriateness of a secured creditor bankruptcy might be 
questioned. One typical situation involves a proposed sale of substantial-
                                                                                                                                      
 1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012). Unless otherwise noted, citations to “section” or “§” are to 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 2. Unless the context requires otherwise, I refer throughout to the beneficiary “secured credi-
tor” for convenience. But this reference should be understood to refer to the situation in which there 
are multiple secured creditors as well. 
 3. Jeffrey A. Stoops Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. 
 4. I have tried to remain faithful to our original goal of setting out the strongest policy argu-
ments both for and against the legitimacy of secured creditor bankruptcies. 
 5. While we certainly share some common ground, our views differ substantially in several re-
spects (albeit more sharply on some issues than others). 
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ly all of a debtor’s assets under Bankruptcy Code section 3636 (a “363 
sale”), often relatively early in a Chapter 11 case.7 Typically, the sale 
would be free and clear of the secured creditor’s security interest (with 
the secured creditor’s consent) and with the security interest attaching to 
the proceeds for subsequent distribution to the secured creditor.8  
Part II. A. of this Article deals with 363 sales. Part II.B of this Article 
then addresses sales under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Part II.C 
then examines the circumstances under which a secured creditor bank-
ruptcy might be converted to a Chapter 7 case or dismissed. Next, Part 
II.D considers the practice of “gifting” in a secured creditor bankruptcy. 
Under this practice, with the secured creditor’s consent a distribution is 
made to or set aside for a person whose claim or interest is junior to the 
secured creditor’s claim. The distribution or set aside ostensibly is made 
from the secured creditor’s collateral, the benefit of which otherwise 
would be received by the secured creditor alone (hence, the “gifting” of 
the collateral). Finally, Part II.E of this Article offers a brief summary of 
the (often inconsistent) treatment of secured party bankruptcies by the 
courts. Part II.E also addresses in this context secured creditor “carve-
outs” from collateral. 
I appreciate that under the current Bankruptcy Code and existing 
case law many courts have the flexibility to embrace a wide variety of 
approaches toward secured creditor bankruptcies and toward the doctri-
nal issues of bankruptcy law that those cases implicate.9 In general, I rec-
ognize that case law and secondary authority exist that both support and 
oppose the appropriateness of secured creditor bankruptcies. For that 
reason, Part III focuses primarily on the bankruptcy policy implications 
of secured party bankruptcies—primarily policies that underpin Chapter 
11.10 Part III asks and offers a range of answers to the question: How 
should bankruptcy law treat secured creditor bankruptcies? Part III first 
sets out two competing visions of secured party bankruptcies. One view 
is generally critical and opposed, the “Against” position, and the other 
generally supportive, the “For” position. Part III then proceeds to pro-
vide rebuttals and surrebuttals of the Against and For positions and to 
discuss and critique the issues that they raise. 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012); see CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 94–95 
(2d ed. 2009). 
 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (authorizing the use, sale, or lease of property of the estate outside 
the ordinary course of business). Although section 363(b)(1) also applies to the use and lease of prop-
erty, for present purposes, sales under section 363 are most relevant. Consequently, this Article gener-
ally refers to “363 sales.” 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (permitting the sale of property of the estate “free and clear of any inter-
est”). 
 9. Of course, any court may be bound by controlling precedent. See, e.g., United States v. 
Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261 (2d Cir. 2013) (“‘[B]inding precedent’ refers to the precedent of this Circuit 
and the Supreme Court.”). 
 10. Accordingly, I generally eschew a detailed exploration of the best or strongest “doctrinal” 
analyses and solutions. 
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Throughout this Article, the focus is trained on the issues raised by 
secured party bankruptcies. Thorough examinations of the broader 
themes of sales under section 363 or under reorganization plans, dismis-
sal, and gifting, for example, are beyond this Article’s scope. 
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR SECURED CREDITOR 
BANKRUPTCIES 
A. 363 Sales 
Section 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the trustee (or 
debtor in possession11) to use, sell, or lease property of the estate “other 
than in the ordinary course of business.”12 This right to dispose is permit-
ted only “after notice and a hearing.”13 But the statute itself provides no 
guidance as to the applicable standards that courts are to apply for ap-
proving or disapproving a 363 sale.14 Not surprisingly, a substantial body 
of case law has filled in the gaps, although not always consistently. In 
general, the court considers aspects of the transaction such as the ade-
quacy and reasonableness of notice, the adequacy of the price, and the 
good faith of the transferee.15 
Most controversial are the 363 sales of all, or substantially all, of a 
debtor estate’s assets. In many situations, there may be good reasons for 
conducting such a 363 sale instead of providing for a sale under a con-
firmed Chapter 11 plan. But there also is cause for skepticism and cau-
tion in this context. In In re Lionel Corporation, the Second Circuit held 
that there must be “a good business reason” for approval of the sale of a 
substantial asset of a debtor outside of a plan of reorganization.16 In  
Lionel, the debtor proposed to sell a controlling stake in another corpo-
ration, which was Lionel’s “most important asset.”17 The Lionel Credi-
tors’ Committee’s insistence on the sale, the court reasoned, was “insuffi-
cient as a matter of fact because it is not a sound business reason and 
insufficient as a matter of law because it ignores the equity interests re-
                                                                                                                                      
 11. Subject to exceptions not relevant here, a debtor in possession has the rights and powers of a 
trustee in Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012). 
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1); see TABB, supra note 6, at 99. 
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (explaining the meaning of “after notice and a hearing”). 
 14. Section 363(b)(1) does not by its terms require a court order approving a nonordinary course 
disposition, but such an order is normally obtained in practice in order to provide necessary comfort to 
a transferee. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th 
ed. 2013) [hereinafter 3 COLLIER]. 
 15. See id. at ¶ 363.02. 
 16. 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 17. Id. at 1065. 
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quired to be weighed and considered under Chapter 11.”18 Other circuits 
have followed Lionel.19 
More recently the Second Circuit revisited the substantial asset 363 
sale issue in a case in which the court upheld the bankruptcy court’s ap-
proval of the sale over the objections of certain creditors. The Second 
Circuit discussed and cited Lionel with approval in In re Chrysler LLC.20 
There, the court noted: 
In the twenty-five years since Lionel, § 363(b) asset sales have be-
come common practice in large-scale corporate bankruptcies . . . . 
Resort to § 363(b) has been driven by efficiency, from the perspec-
tives of sellers and buyers alike. The speed of the process can max-
imize asset value by sale of the debtor’s business as a going con-
cern.21 
Chief among the factors motivating the bankruptcy court’s approval 
(and the Second Circuit’s affirmance) of the sale of the assets by Old 
Chrysler (the Chapter 11 debtor in possession) to New Chrysler was the 
need to preserve going concern value and to dispose of the assets before 
any further deterioration occurred—the “melting ice cube” theory.22 
The objecting secured creditors argued that the 363 sale was “an 
impermissible [so-called] sub rosa plan of reorganization” because cer-
tain unsecured creditors of Old Chrysler were ending up with value (an 
ownership interest in New Chrysler), ostensibly violating the “absolute 
priority” rule because the secured creditors were not being paid in full.23 
But the court pointed out that the bankruptcy court had made clear that 
all of the value of the debtor’s assets was being distributed to the secured 
creditors. The court further noted that the bankruptcy court found that 
all of the equity ownership in New Chrysler was “entirely attributable to 
                                                                                                                                      
 18. Id. at 1071. Subsequent history illustrates the risks that are inherent in a substantial asset 
sale. Lionel eventually sold the asset and received about $20 million more than it would have received 
under the proposed sale for which approval was originally sought. Lionel Agrees to Sell Its 82% Stake 
in Dale for $76.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1985, at 37.  
 19. See, e.g., Stephens Indus. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386, 389–90 (6th Cir. 1986); Inst. Creditors of 
Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th 
Cir. 1986). 
 20. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 113–17 
(2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009). 
 21. Id. at 115–16. 
 22. As the Chrysler court observed, “[w]ith its revenues sinking, its factories dark, and its mas-
sive debts growing, Chrysler fit the paradigm of the melting ice cube.” Id. at 119. The sale in Chrysler 
yielded $2 billion, which was distributed to the secured creditors, against the backdrop of unrefuted 
evidence of a liquidation value of only $800 million. Id. at 118. Moreover, “Chrysler was losing going 
concern value of nearly $100 million each day.” Id. at 119. Relying on the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion 
and the Second Circuit’s oral affirmance in Chrysler, as well as other Second Circuit 363 sale cases, the 
Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved the 363 sale of the assets of General Motors. In re General 
Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 491 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). Following the Second Circuit’s issuance of its 
written opinion in Chrysler the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remand-
ed to the Second Circuit to dismiss the appeal as moot. Chrysler, 558 U.S. at 1087 (2009); In re  
Chrysler, 592 F.3d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 23. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118. Concerning the absolute priority rule and cramdown, see 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2012). I address these issues primarily in connection with the discussion of gifting 
in infra Part II.D. 
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new value—including governmental loans, new technology and new 
management—which were not assets of the debtor’s estate.”24 
The Chrysler court also distinguished the Braniff Airways case.25 In 
Braniff, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s approval (and af-
firmance of the bankruptcy court) of an asset sale because the debtor 
“should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for 
confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the 
plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.”26 For example, the 
transfer agreement in Braniff would have dictated “some of the terms of 
a[ny] future reorganization plan[s]” and would have required a particular 
allocation of proceeds under such a plan or else a valuable asset would 
have been forfeited.27 In order to “specify the terms whereby a reorgani-
zation plan is to be adopted, the parties and the district court must scale 
the hurdles erected in Chapter 11.”28 The Chrysler court acknowledged 
that a sale of “substantially all of a debtor’s assets . . . may well be a reor-
ganization in effect without being the kind of plan rejected in Braniff.”29 
Applying the Lionel analysis, courts in the Second Circuit may approve 
363 sales of substantially all of a debtor’s assets provided that there is a 
“good business reason for the sale.”30 
Two commentators outlined the pre-Chrysler case law on substan-
tial asset 363 sales as follows: 
Bankruptcy law, based on leading 1980s decisions in the Second and 
Fifth Circuits, was largely in good shape doctrinally before Chrysler. 
These decisions established that there must be an appropriate busi-
ness justification for the sale, as exemplified by a business emergen-
cy or a deteriorating business situation best handled by a sale; the 
sale cannot be a sub rosa plan of reorganization that de facto de-
termines core terms more properly determined under section 1129 
via its creditor protections; and if the plan does determine core sec-
tion 1129 features, it can do so only if the court fashions a makeshift 
                                                                                                                                      
 24. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118. 
 25. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 
935 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 26. Id. at 940. 
 27. Id. at 939–40. 
 28. Id. at 940. As examples of these “hurdles,” the court cited 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (governing 
disclosure requirements), 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2012) (concerning voting), 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012) 
(providing the best interest of creditors test), and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012) (setting forth the 
absolute priority rule). 
 29. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 117. Notwithstanding the court’s conclusions, Chrysler has been 
severely criticized. See generally Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganization 
and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375; Mark J. Roe & David A. 
Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010); Todd L. Friedman, Note, The 
Unjustified Business Justification Rule: A Reexamination of the Lionel Canon in Light of the Bankrupt-
cies of Lehman, Chrysler, and General Motors, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 181 (2010). For a contrary 
view, see generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009). I do not engage this criticism here inasmuch as the only present purpose is to 
outline the current state of the case law as necessary to set the stage for our consideration of secured 
creditor bankruptcies. 
 30. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 117. 
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safeguard—a substitute that’s overall consistent with the mandates 
of section 1129.31 
It remains to be seen whether Chrysler and General Motors will 
have a lasting and significant impact on the development of the law of 
substantial asset 363 sales.32 
An important aspect of most substantial asset 363 sales is the sale 
“free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than 
the estate” pursuant to section 363(f).33 In sales free and clear an im-
portant issue is whether one of the five conditions of such a sale have 
been met.34 For present purposes of considering secured creditor bank-
ruptcies, the most important condition is the consent of the entity whose 
interest will be cut off—the relevant secured creditor.35 Given the as-
sumption that the secured creditor is the principal beneficiary of the 
bankruptcy case, we can further assume that the secured creditor will 
consent.36 Another important issue is the type of “interest” that can be 
cut off in a sale free and clear.37 Again, for present purposes the relevant 
point is that a sale free and clear may be an important factor in the se-
cured creditor’s preference for a sale in bankruptcy as opposed to en-
forcement outside bankruptcy.38 
B. Sales Pursuant to Plans of Reorganization 
Section 1123(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “a plan 
may . . . provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of 
the estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of such sale among hold-
ers of claims or interests.”39 Thus, Chapter 11 clearly permits liquidation 
plans. A plan in a secured creditor bankruptcy that provides for a liqui-
dation is, in legal contemplation, quite unremarkable. But, wealth con-
                                                                                                                                      
 31. Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 736. 
 32. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 871 (2014) (proposing a reserve to be set aside from sales 
price at the time of a 363 sale, preserving postsale resolution of potential disputes about valuation and 
priority).  
 33. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 94–95. 
 34. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)–(5); see 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, at ¶ 363.06[2]–[6]. 
 35. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(2) (providing that a trustee may sell property under section 363(b) or sec-
tion 363(c) if “such entity consents”). 
 36. However, if a senior secured creditor consents but a junior secured creditor does not, then 
the court must find that another condition has been satisfied as to the junior. In one interesting case, 
on appeal the conditions held applicable to the junior creditor were determined to be not applicable. 
The senior creditor who purchased at the sale cut off its own senior lien (through its consent) but took 
subject to the junior lien! Although the bankruptcy court’s sale order was not stayed during the appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that mootness protection of section 363(m) ap-
plied only to the sale and not to the “lien-stripping” (i.e., the “free and clear”) aspect of the sale). 
Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW), 391 B.R. 25, 37 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008). 
 37. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, at ¶ 363.06[1], [7]. 
 38. For example, a broad interpretation of “interest” (as the term is used in section 363(f)), 
which would allow the sale to be free and clear of future claims under a successor liability theory, 
could be very attractive to the buyer, and consequently to the secured creditor. With such protection 
for a buyer the collateral may fetch a substantially higher sales price. See Id. at ¶ 363.06[7]. 
 39. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4); see TABB, supra note 6, at 98. 
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servation may dictate an early disposition (the “melting ice cube,” for 
example) in a substantial asset 363 sale, as discussed above.40 As evi-
denced by section 1123(b)(4), such a liquidation under section 363 is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the goals and purposes of Chapter 11. 
C. Conversion or Dismissal 
In addition to objections to substantial asset 363 sales in secured 
creditor bankruptcies, a party in interest (or a court, sua sponte) may 
seek to have a Chapter 11 case converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation case 
or dismissed. In this connection, section 1112(b)(1) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
[O]n request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, 
the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under 
chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the 
best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause unless the court 
determines that the appointment under section 1104(a) of a trustee 
or an examiner is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.41 
Section 1112(b)(4), then, provides that “‘cause’ includes” a lengthy 
list of examples.42 None of the enumerated examples suggest that the 
mere fact of a secured creditor bankruptcy is of itself sufficient “cause” 
for conversion or dismissal. However, one example of cause may be par-
ticularly pertinent in a secured creditor bankruptcy. Subsection 
(b)(4)(A) holds that “‘cause’ includes . . . substantial or continuing loss to 
or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of 
rehabilitation.”43 Note that this is a two-prong test—loss or diminution 
and unlikelihood of rehabilitation. 
The ground for dismissal that probably is most relevant in a secured 
creditor bankruptcy is the lack of good faith. Whether the absence of 
good faith in the filing or maintenance of a Chapter 11 case constitutes 
“cause” under section 1112(b)(1) or is an independent judge-made 
ground, dismissal for lack of good faith (or, as alternatively described, for 
bad faith) is well established in the case law.44 In assessing the absence of 
good faith (or existence of bad faith) the courts generally focus on 
whether there is an abuse of the Chapter 11 process or some form of mis-
conduct.45 
The subjective bad faith inquiry is designed to insure that the peti-
tioner actually intends “to use the provisions of Chapter 11 . . . to reor-
                                                                                                                                      
 40. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 41. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1). 
 42. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(A)–(P). 
 43. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added). 
 44. On dismissal for lack of good faith, see generally 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.07 
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 7 COLLIER]. 
 45. See, e.g., Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 702 (4th Cir. 1989).  
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ganize or rehabilitate an existing enterprise, or to preserve going concern 
values of a viable or existing business.” 46 Put conversely, 
its aim is to determine whether the petitioner’s real motivation is 
“to abuse the reorganization process” and “to cause hardship or to 
delay creditors by resort to the Chapter 11 device merely for the 
purpose of invoking the automatic stay, without an intent or ability 
to reorganize his financial activities.”47 
There is some authority supporting a dismissal for lack of good faith 
because a reorganization is not likely, but these cases generally involve 
additional factors bearing on good or bad faith.48 Otherwise, the first 
prong of the two-prong test of section 1112(b)(4)(A) would be read out 
of existence and superfluous. 
D. Gifting 
Both gifting and carveouts in Chapter 11, whether in connection 
with a plan of reorganization or a substantial asset 363 sale, raise several 
potential conflicts with either the letter or the policies of Bankruptcy 
Code, and in particular Chapter 11. I summarize these aspects of Chapter 
11 at the outset of the discussion in this Subpart.49 
Consider first certain relevant conditions for confirmation of a plan 
in Chapter 11.50 For a plan to be confirmed each holder of a claim or in-
terest in an impaired class51 who has not accepted the plan must receive 
value of not less than the amount the holder would receive in a liquida-
tion of the debtor under Chapter 7.52 This is colloquially referred to as 
the “best interest of creditors” test (although it applies to holders of in-
terests as well). Note that the best interests test applies to each holder. 
Another requirement of confirmation applies to each class of claims or 
interests. Each class must either accept the plan or not be impaired by 
                                                                                                                                      
 46. Id. (quoting In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549, 564 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981)). 
 47. Id. (quoting In re Thirtieth Place, Inc. v. Thirtieth Place, Inc., 30 B.R. 503, 505 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1983)). In Carolin the Fourth Circuit also held that dismissal for bad faith requires not only a de-
termination of subjective bad faith but also of “objective futility”—that a reorganization is not realisti-
cally possible. Id. at 700–01. The Eleventh Circuit, however, has held that bad faith alone is sufficient 
for dismissal and that the potential for a successful reorganization does not override the determination 
of bad faith. Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 48. See, e.g., C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship v. Norton Co., 113 F3d 1304, 1310 (2d Cir. 1997). As the C-TC 
9th court observed, “[w]hen it is clear that, from the date of filing, the debtor has no reasonable prob-
ability of emerging from the bankruptcy proceedings and no realistic chance of reorganizing, then the 
Chapter 11 petition may be frivolous.” Id. But there were other factors supporting the determination 
of bad faith. For example, the Chapter 11 case essentially involved a two-party dispute and was in ef-
fect a litigation tactic. Id. at 1309.  
 49. I address other potential inconsistencies in our presentation of the cases for and against se-
cured creditor bankruptcies in infra Part III. 
 50. See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 1132 (providing an overview of confirmation require-
ments). 
 51. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012) (regarding classification); 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (concerning impair-
ment). 
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). 
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the plan.53 In addition, if a class of claims is impaired, at least one im-
paired class must accept the plan (without taking into account any insider 
acceptances).54 
The so-called “cramdown” requirements are also relevant here. The 
cramdown can be invoked if section 1129(a)(8) has not been satisfied be-
cause an impaired class of claims or interests has not accepted a plan. In 
that situation the plan can be confirmed nevertheless under section 
1129(b) “if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equi-
table, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired un-
der, and has not accepted, the plan.”55 The statute does not define or ex-
plain the concept of unfair discrimination, although case law provides 
guidance.56 However, the statute does address what is “fair and equitable 
with respect to a class” in section 1129(b)(2), which incorporates what is 
known as the “absolute priority rule.”57 With respect to a class of secured 
claims a plan is fair and equitable if the holders receive, essentially, the 
value of their secured claims.58 Of more interest in the context of gifting 
and carveouts, however, it is the fair and equitable treatment of a nonac-
cepting class of unsecured claims. A plan provides fair and equitable 
treatment of a class of unsecured claims if either the holders receive val-
ue equal to the allowed amount of their claims or if the holders of claims 
or interests junior to the holders of the unsecured claims do not receive 
“on account of such junior claim or interest any property.”59 For exam-
ple, in a debtor’s simple capital structure, imagine an accepting class of 
impaired secured creditors, a nonaccepting class of unsecured creditors, 
and common shareholders. So long as the shareholders receive nothing 
“on account of” their junior claims, the plan is fair and equitable for the 
class of unsecured creditors.60 Hence the moniker “absolute priority” is 
evoked—junior classes get nothing unless senior classes receive a full re-
covery, the senior classes’ priorities being “absolute.” 61 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). 
 54. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). 
 56. For a succinct overview of the judicial treatment of unfair discrimination, see Harvey R.  
Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The Implications of the Third Circuit’s Armstrong Decision on Creative 
Corporate Restructuring: Will Strict Construction of the Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 Con-
sensus Less Likely?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1345, 1387–90 (2006). 
 57. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2); see also Miller & Berkovich, supra note 56, at 1347. 
 58. This can be achieved by the holder’s retention of liens and receipt of cash payments at least 
equal to the amount of the allowed claim and with a present value at least equal to the collateral value. 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). Alternatively, fair and equitable treatment can consist of the holders’ 
realization “of the indubitable equivalent” of their claims. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). Another 
alternative is for the collateral to be sold free and clear of the liens with the liens attaching to the pro-
ceeds, followed by treatment of the proceeds in accordance with clauses (i) or (iii) mentioned above. 
 59. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). There is an exception for individuals, which is not relevant 
here. 
 60. Recall that by the time the issue of cramdown is reached, the court already has determined 
that the best interests test under section 1129(a)(7) has been met for all of the holders in the nonac-
cepting class. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 61. See Miller & Berkovich, supra note 56, at 1347. 
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Consider next absolute priority and unfair discrimination in the con-
text of secured creditor gifting.62 For example, if the secured creditor gifts 
a portion of its bankruptcy distribution to the old equity (interest hold-
ers), leaving the unsecured creditors to take nothing, does this violate ab-
solute priority? Similarly, if the secured creditor gifts some unsecured 
creditors but provides nothing to other unsecured creditors of equal 
rank, does this amount to unfair discrimination? Cases dealing with these 
and related issues turn on the factual and procedural settings and many 
cannot be reconciled.63 
Most would mark the beginning of the golden (or not) era of gifting 
with a decision by the First Circuit more than twenty years ago in Official 
Unsecured Creditors’ Committee v. Stern (In re SPM Manufacturing 
Corp).64 SPM involved an agreement by a secured creditor with a Chap-
ter 11 creditors’ committee to share with the debtor’s general unsecured 
creditors proceeds of the collateral recovered by the secured creditor.65 
The result of this agreement meant that a priority tax claim (for which 
the debtor’s former management members were personally liable) would 
not be paid. Following a sale of the collateral, the secured creditor sought 
to recover the proceeds, a portion of which it proposed to distribute to 
the committee for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy 
court denied the secured creditor’s request and ordered that the portion 
of the proceeds intended for the unsecured creditors be paid instead to 
the trustee for distribution according to the applicable priorities. 66 This 
meant that the priority tax claimant would receive those proceeds. The 
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling. 67 
The First Circuit reversed the district court. It explained: 
 [T]he distribution scheme of section 726 (and, by implication, the 
priorities of section 507) does not come into play until all valid liens 
                                                                                                                                      
 62. Because my focus here is on secured creditor bankruptcies, I primarily address gifting by a 
secured creditor as a tool for enhancing its recovery. However, cases involving gifting by unsecured 
creditors, some of which I mention in the following discussion, also may bear on secured creditor gift-
ing. 
 63. On gifting and associated issues, see generally Hollace T. Cohen, In re Armstrong World 
Industries, Inc.: Absolute Priority Reigns Supreme, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW (2005); Michael Carnevale, Comment, Is Gifting Dead in Chapter 11 Reorganizations? Examin-
ing Absolute Priority in the Wake of the Second Circuit’s No-Gift Rule in In Re DBSD, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 225 (2012); Richard L. Ferrell, Gifting Carve-Outs in Asset Sales Under § 363 Still Controver-
sial, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2009, at 16; Lauren E. McDivitt, Comment, What Do You Mean There 
Won’t Be Gifts This Year? Why Practitioners Cannot Rely upon Gifting Provisions in Chapter 11 Reor-
ganization Plans in the Fifth Circuit, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1019 (2012); Miller & Berkovich, supra 
note 56; Thomas E. Patterson, Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations: You Can’t Give it Away: Gifts, 
Carveouts, Settlements and Other Incursions into Absolute Priority, SS029 ALI-ABA 531 (Am. Law. 
Inst.–Am. Bar. Assoc. Course of Study), Apr. 28, 2011; Norman L. Pernick et al., Beware of Creditors 
Bearing Gifts: A Primer on Sharing Property in Chapter 11, 22 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 725 
(2013); Damian S. Schaible & Eli J. Vonnegut, SPM Manufacturing to Journal Register: Indicators of a 
Successful “Gift Plan,” AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2009, at 14. 
 64. 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 65. See TABB, supra note 6, at 728 n.4. 
 66. In re SPM Mfg., 984 F.2d at 1310. 
 67. Id. 
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on the property are satisfied. . . . If a lien is perfected and not oth-
erwise invalidated by law, it must be satisfied out of the assets it en-
cumbers before any proceeds of the assets are available to unse-
cured claimants, including those having priority (such as priority tax 
creditors) . . . . Citizens held a valid lien on all of the SPM assets; 
these were sold for $5 million. The bankruptcy court allowed  
Citizens’ secured claim in that amount. Clearly, then, absent the or-
der, the entire $5 million belonged to Citizens in satisfaction of its 
lien, leaving nothing for the estate to distribute to the other credi-
tors, including the I.R.S. The bankruptcy court’s order forced  
Citizens to transfer to the estate a portion of its own $5 million 
notwithstanding the court’s recognition of Citizens’ right to receive 
that sum in full. 
 Because Citizens’ secured claim absorbed all of SPM’s assets, 
there was nothing left for any other creditor in this case . . . . [I]t is 
hard to see how the priority creditors lost anything owed them giv-
en the fact there would have been nothing left for the priority credi-
tors after the $5 million was distributed to Citizens. The “syphon-
ing” of the money to general, unsecured creditors came entirely 
from the $5 million belonging to Citizens, to which no one else had 
any claim of right under the Bankruptcy Code.68 
Note that SPM was a Chapter 7 case (at the time of distribution) in 
which the absolute priority rule did not apply. However, the distribution-
al scheme under Chapter 7 is every bit as rigid as that under Chapter 11. 
The relevant inquiry, then, is whether gifting is a permissible means of 
allowing a junior creditor’s recovery to the exclusion of a senior creditor, 
notwithstanding the otherwise applicable distributional regime (regard-
less of the applicable chapter). Also note that the gifting distribution was 
to be made by the secured creditor, not by the trustee or under a plan. 
Moreover, there was no dispute as to the secured creditor’s priority in 
SPM. 
Relying to some extent on SPM, gifting under a plan of reorganiza-
tion by a secured creditor for the benefit of some classes of unsecured 
creditors, to the exclusion of other creditors of equal rank, has been up-
held over objections that it amounted to unfair discrimination.69 Such se-
lective gifting under a plan of a portion of what otherwise would be re-
ceived by classes of unsecured creditors in favor of some, but not all, 
unsecured trade creditors also has been permitted as not unfairly dis-
criminatory.70 Other courts have taken opposing views, holding that se-
                                                                                                                                      
 68. Id. at 1312 (internal citations omitted). 
 69. In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 611 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); In re Parke 
Imperial Canton, Ltd., No. 93–61004, 1994 WL 842777, at *11 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 1994). In 
Genesis the gifting also was for the benefit of the debtor’s former equity holders. In re Genesis Health 
Ventures, 266 B.R. at 611.  
 70. In In re WorldCom, Inc., for example, the court stated that: 
Any enhanced value received by holders of [certain claims] on account of contributions from oth-
er Classes is not a treatment of these Claims under the plan and does not constitute unfair dis-
crimination. The greater value received by [certain creditors] as a result of the Contributions does 
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cured creditor gifting in connection with plan of reorganization does not 
excuse disparate treatment of creditors of equal rank that otherwise 
would constitute unfair discrimination.71 
Significant decisions in the Second and Third Circuits have substan-
tially restricted the utility of gifting in those circuits. In In re Armstrong 
World Industries, Inc.,72 the Third Circuit held that the proposed plan 
violated the absolute priority rule by allowing former equity holders to 
receive warrants for equity. The plan provided that if a particular class 
did not accept the plan, then the warrants would be issued to another 
class of creditors that would automatically gift them to the former equity 
holders.73 The court distinguished SPM because it was a Chapter 7 case 
that did not implicate the absolute priority rule.74 Moreover, the gifting 
secured creditor distributed property—its collateral—that was not dis-
tributable under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules and the SPM gift 
was a carveout from the secured creditor’s collateral.75 The warrants in 
Armstrong, on the other hand, were created to end up in the hands of 
former equity holders. After Armstrong, the District of Delaware Bank-
ruptcy Court has allowed gifting in connection with a 363 sale and not in 
the context of a plan or reorganization. In In re World Health  
Alternatives, Inc.,76 the court approved a settlement in connection with an 
asset sale under which claims against the secured creditor were released 
and the secured creditor carved out of it collateral value for the benefit 
of unsecured creditors. 
The Second Circuit also held that a plan violated the absolute prior-
ity rule in In re DBSD North America, Inc.77 The DBSD plan allocated 
                                                                                                                                      
not violate the Bankruptcy Code, because the Contributions are the result of other creditors 
(holders of [certain claims]) voluntarily sharing their recoveries under the Plan with [certain other 
creditors] . . . . The greater value received by [those other creditors] is not the result of the Debt-
ors’ distribution of estate property to such creditors. Creditors are generally free to do whatever 
they wish with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including sharing them with other credi-
tors, so long as recoveries received under the Plan by other creditors are not impacted. 
In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at *60-*61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (in-
ternal citations omitted). See also In re Genesis Health Ventures, 266 B.R. at 612; In re M Corp. Fin., 
Inc., 160 B.R. 941, 964 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (permitting gifting by unsecured creditor under plan of 
reorganization). 
 71. In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex, Inc., 264 B.R. 850, 864–66 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001) (hold-
ing that disparate treatment that is funded and determined by secured creditor does not excuse unfair 
discrimination); see also In re Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889, 894–95 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2004) (stating that unfair discrimination was partially funded by anticipated litigation recoveries as 
well as gifting by secured creditor and consequently was a distribution of property of the estate; distin-
guishing SPM because SPM did not involve property of the estate or the confirmation process). 
 72. 432 F.3d 507, 509 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 73. For a sharp critique of the Armstrong court’s efforts to distinguish SPM and other earlier 
cases and the court’s analysis in general, see Miller & Berkovich, supra note 56, at 1415–25. 
 74. In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.2d at 514. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 344 B.R. 291, 297–98 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); see also In re TSIC Inc., 393 B.R. 71, 78 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2008) (approving a settlement over U.S. Trustee’s objection in which buyer in 363 sale funded 
a trust for benefit of general unsecured creditors). 
 77. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 97 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
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about five percent of the equity in the reorganized debtor to the debtor’s 
former equity holder. The debtor and first and second lien noteholders 
exhausted all of the assets and the unsecured creditors were not entitled 
to any distribution. Consequently, the former equity holder was receiving 
value gifted by the second lien noteholders. In the court’s view, however, 
the former equity received “property,” “under the plan,” and “on ac-
count of” its junior interest.78 Because the objecting creditor did not re-
ceive property of a value equal to the amount of its allowed claim, sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(B) was not satisfied.79 The court effectively eliminates 
gifting under a plan as a permissible means of providing value to a junior 
class when an intervening class of claims is not fully satisfied.80 
The absolute priority rule and the prohibition of unfair discrimina-
tion are not the only bankruptcy policies that could be offended by gift-
ing. In In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, the bankruptcy court declined to ap-
prove a “disclosure” (urging rejection of the debtor’s plan) of a secured 
creditor’s “commitment” to provide a fifty percent dividend to certain 
unsecured creditors if the secured creditor was relieved of the automatic 
stay or the case was converted to a Chapter 7.81 The secured creditor con-
tended that it was merely offering to share the proceeds of its collateral if 
it were enabled to recover in a timely fashion, relying in part on SPM.82 
The court rejected that contention, concluding that the secured creditor’s 
commitment and proposed disclosure was an attempt to avoid the re-
quirements and protections that would accompany a plan proposal.83 In 
In re Goffena, the bankruptcy court refused to approve an agreement be-
tween a secured creditor and the trustee under which the creditor would 
pay the trustee’s fees out of proceeds of collateral while not providing for 
other administrative and priority claims.84 Once proceeds were received 
by the trustee they would be property of the estate and distributable ac-
cording to the distributional scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.85 In In re 
Scott Cable Communications, Inc.,86 the bankruptcy court held that a 
proposed liquidating plan violated section 1129(a)(9), which requires 
payment in full of administrative expenses at confirmation,87 and section 
                                                                                                                                      
 78. Id. at 95–97. 
 79. Id. at 90–92. 
 80. Id. at 94–97. The court distinguished SPM as it was a Chapter 7 and because there is “clear 
‘statutory support’ to reject gifting” under section 1129(b)(2)(B). Id. at 98. Moreover, because the se-
cured creditor in SPM had obtained relief from the automatic stay, the court effectively treated the 
gifted property “as no longer part of the estate.” Id. After DBSD, the WorldCom decision by the 
Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York would not appear to have any continued vital-
ity, at least not in the Second Circuit. See supra note 70. The Second Circuit had earlier reserved deci-
sion as to the efficacy and permissibility of gifting outside the plan context. See Motorola, Inc. v. Offi-
cial Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 461 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 81. In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, 254 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2000). 
 82. Id. at 10. 
 83. Id. at 12–13. 
 84. In re Goffena, 175 B.R. 386, 392 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994). 
 85. Id. at 392. 
 86. 227 B.R. 596 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998). 
 87. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (2012). 
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1129(d), which prohibits plans with the principal purpose of avoiding 
taxes.88 The plan proposed to pay administrative and other priority claims 
and general unsecured claims from proceeds of secured creditors’ collat-
eral, but not the payment of capital gains taxes of the sale of the debtor’s 
assets.89 Because the sale was to occur postconfirmation, the debtor ar-
gued that such taxes (administrative expenses) were not required to be 
paid.90 The court rejected the debtor’s argument, finding that the admin-
istrative period extended to include the postconfirmation sale.91 
E. Secured Creditor Bankruptcies and Carveouts 
Some cases and commentary address directly the issue of a secured 
creditor bankruptcy, which is the principal focus of this Article.92 How-
ever, the case law is sparse and it is safe to say that no consensus has 
emerged. 
In United States Trustee v. GPA Technical Consultants, Inc.,93 the 
court held that it was not appropriate to dismiss or convert the case not-
withstanding that it appeared that the case was likely to benefit only the 
secured creditor.94 Similarly, in In re Western Pacific Airlines, Inc.,95 the 
court exercised its discretion not to dismiss even though the case was be-
ing directed by and for the benefit of the secured DIP financer.96 
In contrast to these cases, consider In re Encore Healthcare  
Associates.97 Encore involved a proposed 363 sale of all of a debtor’s as-
sets for $2.5 million.98 The assets secured an obligation of more than $8 
million.99 The sale proceeds were to be used to pay the costs of sale with 
                                                                                                                                      
 88. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(d). 
 89. In re Scott Cable Commc’ns, 227 B.R. at 598. 
 90. Id. at 600. 
 91. Id. at 600–01. 
 92. See generally Ferrell, supra note 63; Andrew L. Turscak, Jr & Alan R. Lepene, Must a Se-
cured Creditor Pay to Play in Chapter 11?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2009, at 36; Jay R. Indyke & 
Brent Weisenberg, Committee Issues: Carve-Outs; Liquidations for Benefit of Banks; Liability; Incon-
venient Delaware Issues; Liquidation for the Benefit of Secured Lenders: An Unsecured Creditor’s 
Committee Prospective, 041802 ABI-CLE 223 (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, VA), Apr. 18, 2002; 
Robert J. Keach et al., A Chapter 11 Case Should Not Necessarily Be Dismissed Because It Principally 
or Solely Benefits the Secured Creditor, 042006 ABI-CLE 7 (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, VA), Apr. 
20, 2006; Judy A. O’Neill & John A. Simon, A Chapter 11 Case Should Be Dismissed If It Would Only 
Benefit Secured Creditors, ABI 24th Annual Meeting (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, VA), Apr. 21, 
2006; Patterson, supra note 63.  
 93. U.S. Trustee v. GPA Technical Consultants, Inc (In re GPA Technical Consultants, Inc.), 
106 B.R. 139 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). 
 94. Id. at 143 (“[T]here need not be any unsecured creditors in a bona fide reorganization, and 
thus the only creditor interests to be taken into account may sometimes be secured creditors.”). 
 95. 218 B.R. 590 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998). 
 96. Id. at 595–97 (citing GPA with approval); see also Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Dick Corp., 351 F.3d 
290, 291–94 (7th Cir. 2003). In Mellon, the secured DIP financer was granted a security interest in the 
debtor’s preference actions. Although only the secured creditor stood to benefit from the preference 
action, that was not a defense. “The operating business counts as an ‘estate’ without regard to the 
identity (and priority) of those who will receive distributions eventually.” Id. at 293. 
 97. 312 B.R. 52 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004). 
 98. Id. at 54–55. 
 99. Id. at 54. 
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the balance remitted to the secured creditor.100 The court, sua sponte, de-
nied approval of the sale procedures on the basis that the court would 
not approve the sale itself.101 In the court’s view, there was no business 
justification for the sale under the Lionel doctrine.102 The court cited with 
approval a case reaching essentially the same result under similar circum-
stances.103 
The Encore court distinguished (and apparently cited with approv-
al) cases approving substantial asset 363 sales under different factual set-
tings.104 The 363 sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets was ap-
proved in In re Medical Software Solutions.105 In that case, there were 
insufficient funds to continue operations, the assets were about to signifi-
cantly decline in value, and there was a carveout from the secured credi-
tor’s collateral to cover both administrative claims and a distribution for 
general unsecured creditors.106 The court in In re Rausch Manufacturing 
Co. also approved such a 363 sale.107 The court reasoned that the sale 
would allow the buyer to continue the debtor’s business as a viable firm 
with continuing employment of employees and continuing production. 108 
In contrast, in Encore the debtor had “no operating business with em-
ployees that is preserved by reason of this [i.e., the proposed] sale as the 
Debtor does not operate a business but merely leases real property.”109 
It is not unusual for a secured creditor to carve out from proceeds of 
its collateral funds to cover professional fees and other administrative 
expenses, often in connection with the secured creditor’s postpetition 
DIP financing order.110 Similarly, a secured creditor may agree to a 
carveout from proceeds of a 363 sale to cover administrative expenses 
and to fund a distribution to unsecured creditors, as in Medical Software 
discussed above.111 Commentators have noted that in a secured creditor 
                                                                                                                                      
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 57–58. 
 102. Id. at 54–55, 57. 
 103. Id. at 56–57 (citing In re Fremont Battery Co., 73 B.R. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987)). In 
Fremont, the court held that there was no business justification for the sale because it effectively would 
terminate the debtor’s existence and there would be no assets on which to base a plan. More relevant 
to present purposes, the court noted that “the proceeds from the proposed sale would, at most, benefit 
one creditor only. The sale would not create proceeds that would inure to the benefit of the unsecured 
creditors.” In re Fremont Battery, 73 B.R. at 279. 
 104. In re Encore Healthcare Assocs., 312 B.R. at 57. 
 105. 286 B.R. 431 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002); see also In re Channel One Commc’ns, Inc., 117 B.R. 
493 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (detailing why a quick sale was necessary to maximize going concern val-
ue and price was in excess of amounts secured by liens and encumbrances). 
 106. In re Medical Software Solutions, 286 B.R. at 440–42. 
 107. 59 B.R. 501, 503 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).  
 108. Id. 
 109. In re Encore Healthcare Assocs., 312 B.R. at 57. 
 110. See In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[I]t has been the 
uniform practice in this Court . . . to insist on a carve out from a super-priority status and post-petition 
lien in a reasonable amount designed to provide for payment of the fees of debtor’s and the commit-
tees’ counsel and possible trustee’s counsel in order to preserve the adversary system. Absent such 
protection, the collective rights and expectations of all parties-in-interest are sorely prejudiced.”). 
 111. In re Medical Software Solutions, 286 B.R. at 442. 
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bankruptcy the secured creditor may be required to “pay to play”—i.e., 
to carve out of its collateral funds for the benefit of general unsecured 
creditors. 
The question typically arises in the context of a preplan confirma-
tion section 363 sale involving the proposed disposition of substantially 
all of a debtor’s assets where sale proceeds will be less than the aggregate 
value of existing liens. One common method of appeasing an agitated 
creditors’ committee under these circumstances is for the secured lender 
to carve out a portion of its recovery for the benefit of unsecured credi-
tors.112 In addition to appeasing a creditors’ committee, such a carveout 
also may appease a court that otherwise might not tolerate a secured 
creditor bankruptcy. 
III. SECURED CREDITOR BANKRUPTCIES: THE CASES FOR AND 
AGAINST 
A. Overview 
In this Part, I alternatively assume the roles of Against and For. 
Against first identifies particular aspects of secured creditor bankruptcies 
that plausibly are objectionable and attempts to lay out the strongest, 
most convincing, positive case for why such aspects actually are objec-
tionable. For next identifies the aspects of secured creditor bankruptcies 
that plausibly are beneficial and not objectionable and, again, attempts to 
state the strongest, most convincing, positive case for why such aspects 
actually are not objectionable. Then For and Against provide rebuttals 
and surrebuttals of the cases against and for secured creditor bankrupt-
cies. Most of the plausibly objectionable aspects of secured creditor 
bankruptcies are mentioned in Part II’s discussion of the various relevant 
legal issues that have arisen.113 For that reason, this Part proceeds to iden-
tify and analyze policy issues, but it is not a legal brief-like effort to make 
the best cases for and against based on current case law. Indeed, under 
existing law, a court (if not constrained by binding precedent) could 
reach the results favored by either Against or For. To be clear, the fol-
lowing statements of the cases for and against secured creditor bankrupt-
cies and the corresponding rebuttals and surrebuttals do not necessarily 
reflect my views. Instead, my goal is to produce a thorough exposure of 
the various plausible policy positions that might persuade a willing, open-
minded court to follow one path or the other. 
My standard for whether an aspect of a secured creditor bankruptcy 
is objectionable—or not—is whether that aspect offends a substantial 
policy that underlies or is incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code. This is 
not an easy task for several reasons. For one thing, although there are 
                                                                                                                                      
 112. Turscak & Lepene, supra note 92, at 36. 
 113. See supra Part II. 
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situations in which a secured creditor bankruptcy should not be tolerat-
ed, at least in some situations secured creditor bankruptcies should stand. 
Presenting a second difficulty, I must take care to hold as many variables 
as possible constant while maintaining the focus primarily on the secured 
creditor bankruptcy variable. Otherwise, I risk extending the debate to 
the whole of bankruptcy law. The goal is to concentrate on what may or 
may not be objectionable and not on the particular remedy or procedural 
posture (such as whether a substantial asset 363 sale should be approved, 
whether a case should be dismissed or converted, or whether a plan fails 
to meet the requirements for confirmation). A final difficulty is that I 
have not been allocated an unlimited number of pages to tell my story 
(or stories). 
The paradigm is a Chapter 11 case in which most of the assets are 
subject to the secured creditor’s claim, the secured creditor is under-
secured, and a sale of the assets is proposed either in a 363 sale or under 
a liquidating plan of reorganization. While I realize that not all secured 
creditor bankruptcies have fallen into or will fall into this paradigm, most 
have and probably will. 
B. The Case Against (or, “It’s the Bankruptcy Code’s Way or the 
Highway . . .”114) 
It is best first to identify what is not objectionable. Straight liquida-
tion under Chapter 7, with collateral subject to secured creditors’ claims 
handled by the trustee, certainly is appropriate.115 Sales under section 363 
are appropriate in a Chapter 7 or 11, but only if no incentives or induce-
ments (e.g., gifting or carveouts) are provided to professionals (as exist-
ing or future administrative claimants) or other creditors.116 These quali-
fications imply that there would be some equity in the collateral, thereby 
making it worth the trustee’s (or debtor in possession’s) while to deal 
with and dispose of it. It follows that there would be at least some value 
available for application to administrative expenses and perhaps other 
priority and general unsecured claims. Thus, these circumstances would 
not amount to a secured creditor bankruptcy as conceived here. 
The foregoing identification leaves much that is objectionable. A 
Chapter 11 filing as to which the debtor and secured creditor contem-
plate a sale or other disposition of assets that requires the application of 
principles found only in the Bankruptcy Code (such as a 363 sale free 
and clear of liens and encumbrances) is objectionable if two additional 
circumstances also are contemplated. The first is accomplishment of the 
disposition and other related arrangements without the benefit of a plan 
of reorganization or by methods not specifically authorized by the Bank-
                                                                                                                                      
 114. Cf. RELIENT K, My Way or the Highway . . ., on THE ANATOMY OF THE TONGUE IN CHEEK 
(Gotee Records 2006). 
 115. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84 (2012).  
 116. See supra Part II.A, D–E.  
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ruptcy Code. The second has two alternative criteria—either the secured 
creditor pays or allocates collateral (or its proceeds) to professionals or 
creditors as part of an arrangement to induce participation and coopera-
tion (i.e., gifting or carveouts) or the benefits of the case would inure 
solely (or nearly so) to the secured creditor. The objection here is based 
on policy, not preemption, and the objectionable Chapter 11 filing should 
not be permitted or the case should not be maintained.117 The following 
discussion addresses the bases for the objection. 
Bankruptcy has traditionally been a collective proceeding with the 
goal of enhancing recoveries for unsecured creditors beyond those that 
state court remedies could provide to the creditors as a body. The man-
datory appointment of an unsecured creditors’ committee reflects this 
policy.118 Such a collective proceeding aided by the automatic stay also 
discourages destruction of a debtor’s operations through the exercise of 
state-law collection remedies. A secured creditor bankruptcy lacks this 
collective aspect, which lies at the functional core of bankruptcy policy. 
A secured party bankruptcy seeks to co-opt what is intended to be a col-
lective proceeding to resolve what is, essentially, a two-party dispute. 
The Bankruptcy Code contemplates liquidation under Chapter 7 
and reorganization under Chapter 11.119 But many, perhaps most, secured 
creditor bankruptcies are functionally indistinguishable from a liquida-
tion that employs the auspices (and tools) of Chapter 11. There is no val-
ue for equity holders or unsecured creditors and the secured creditor 
simply liquidates its collateral through a nonforeclosure sale in Chapter 
11. While the Bankruptcy Code does contemplate liquidating plans, in 
many secured creditor bankruptcies a sale is conducted under section 363 
as opposed to a liquidation pursuant to a plan of reorganization.120 More-
over, in many cases the proceeds of the 363 sale are distributed outside a 
plan.121 Having used the tools provided by the Bankruptcy Code (such as 
the automatic stay and 363 sales free and clear) in Chapter 11 (including 
operation of the debtor’s business), the debtor is liquidated and the care-
fully crafted provisions relating to the proposal of a plan of reorganiza-
tion and leading to ultimate confirmation of a plan are bypassed.122 
The Bankruptcy Code provides a specific set of distributional priori-
ties in section 507, with priority claimants (according to their rankings, 
                                                                                                                                      
 117. The objectionable case might support grounds for dismissal based on bad faith or conversion 
to Chapter 7. It might also support other remedies or the denial of requested relief. To reiterate the 
point made earlier, my goal in this Part is to identify what might (or might not) be objectionable based 
on bankruptcy policy and not to focus on particular doctrinal or procedural settings. 
 118. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). An exception may be made, for cause, in the case of a small business 
debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(3). 
 119. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–74. 
 120. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012). 
 121. See Shari Siegal, Acquiring All or Part of a Troubled Business, PRAC. LAW., Aug. 2003, at 11, 
12–13 (2003), available at http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/PL_TPL0308-
SIEGEL_thumb.pdf (“The advantage of the 363 sale . . . is that it is generally done outside of a plan of 
reorganization.”).  
 122. See id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–74. 
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inter se) being awarded priority over general unsecured creditors.123 
These can be varied only pursuant to the Chapter 11 plan process. How-
ever, in secured creditor bankruptcies the debtor and secured party often 
seek to vary the priorities (as well as those among general unsecured 
creditors and equity interest holders) through gifting, carveouts, or 
both.124 When successful, these private transfer schemes, unblessed and 
unregulated by Congress, serve to undermine the absolute priority rule 
or to unfairly discriminate,125 thereby returning the process to the bad old 
days of pre-absolute priority rule federal equity receiverships.126 The se-
cured creditor reaps benefits from selective application of the Bankrupt-
cy Code, without lobbying for relevant changes in the Bankruptcy Code 
and without paying for the use of the bankruptcy courts. By utilizing the 
bankruptcy court for its individual gains, the secured creditor effects a 
private taking of a public good. 
Secured creditor bankruptcies produce results desired by the se-
cured creditor but ignore the state courts, although it is primarily state 
law that confers on the secured creditor the benefits of the collateral. 
Under Butner, it is state law that generally determines the existence and 
nature of property rights.127 But, in a secured creditor bankruptcy, mat-
ters of state law such as validity and priority are turned over to the bank-
ruptcy courts.128 Without specific authorization in the Bankruptcy Code 
for secured creditor bankruptcies, and given the detailed and specific re-
organization provisions in Chapter 11, the power and jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy courts to give effect to these cases is questionable.129 
In addition to being objectionable as a matter of bankruptcy policy, 
secured creditor bankruptcies simply are not necessary. For collateral 
consisting of personal property or fixtures, Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) section 9-617 provides a secured creditor with sufficient flexi-
bility and protection.130 Under that provision, a secured creditor’s disposi-
tion of collateral to a transferee for value following default transfers the 
debtor’s rights, discharges the secured creditor’s security interest, and 
                                                                                                                                      
 123. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 674–86. 
 124. See supra Part II.D–E. 
 125. When a plan is involved, secured creditor gifting to a class of general unsecured creditors 
also could be employed to induce plan acceptance by an impaired class, thus undermining the safe-
guard provided by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). 
 126. For a historical discussion concerning federal equity receiverships, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., 
DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 56–70 (2001). 
 127. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and de-
fined by state law.”).  
 128. Id. at 54 n.9 (“The Federal Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8, gives Congress the powers to estab-
lish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States. In view of this grant of 
authority to the Congress it has been settled from an early date that state laws to the extent that they 
conflict with the laws of Congress, enacted under its constitutional authority, on the subject of bank-
ruptcies are suspended.”).  
 129. See Law v. Siegel, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194–98 (2014) (finding that a bankruptcy court exceeded 
its statutory and inherent powers by surcharging debtor’s exempt property and that bankruptcy courts 
lack authority to deny an exemption on grounds not specified in Bankruptcy Code). 
 130. U.C.C. § 9-617 (2014). 
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discharges security interests and liens subordinate to that security inter-
est.131 Moreover, a good faith transferee in such a disposition takes free of 
such rights and interests (even if the secured creditor failed to comply 
with UCC Article 9).132 It follows that a secured creditor can sell  
collateral free and clear outside bankruptcy and without relying on sec-
tion 363. 
If and to the extent that a secured creditor wishes or needs the assis-
tance of a court, bear in mind that the bankruptcy courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction133—and Article I courts to boot.134 Bankruptcy courts 
can only enter orders consistent with and authorized by the Bankruptcy 
Code.135 As argued above, bankruptcy courts may lack the power to ef-
fect a secured creditor bankruptcy.136 In contrast, all states have courts of 
general jurisdiction, which have the power to deal comprehensively with 
the assets and parties before them.137 Moreover, state court judgments 
are entitled to full faith and credit in other states and benefit from laws 
providing for the domestication and enforcement of foreign judgments.138 
Because bankruptcy courts, like state courts, may be limited by the doc-
trine of successor liability, it is not necessarily the case that a bankruptcy 
court’s order or judgment is substantially superior to that of a state 
court.139 
C. The Case For (or, “It’s Not Easy Being Secured”140) 
A Chapter 11 case should be permitted and should not be dismissed 
solely because it benefits only or primarily a secured creditor. However, 
maintaining a secured creditor bankruptcy should be subject to appro-
priate limitations and conditions, which are discussed below. 
                                                                                                                                      
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. § 9-617(b). 
 133. Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1194–98. 
 134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 57–58. 
 135. See Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1194–95.  
 136. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 137. Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) (“A state court’s jurisdiction is general, in that it lays 
hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). See generally, 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS: RES 
JUDICATA, § 4467, at 16 (2d ed. 2002) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution provides 
that the judicial proceedings of a state shall be given full faith and credit in every other state, and em-
powers Congress to prescribe the effect of such proceedings.”).  
 139. Note as well that there is no reason that states could not replicate section 363(f) for sales free 
and clear with a broadly applicable statute that would be responsive to the needs of secured creditors. 
Special courts for the application of such a statute also could be created. Cf. Court of Chancery Juris-
diction, DEL. STATE COURTS, http://courts.delaware.gov/Chancery/jurisdiction.stm (last visited Nov. 
10, 2014) (“In today’s practice, the litigation in the Court of Chancery consists largely of corporate 
matters, trusts, estates, and other fiduciary matters, disputes involving the purchase and sale of land, 
questions of title to real estate, and commercial and contractual matters in general.”).  
 140. Cf. Joe Raposo & Jim Henson, Bein’ Green, on SESAME STREET (PBS Kids television broad-
cast Mar. 10, 1970), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIOiwg2iHio. 
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Bankruptcy law is a subset of civil procedure that does, and should, 
vindicate the interests of the holders of legal entitlements in relation to a 
debtor in financial distress.141 The principal relevant holders of legal enti-
tlements are creditors and holders of equity interests.142 Secured creditors 
are creditors.143 If (1) the only creditor benefited by a Chapter 11 case is 
the secured creditor; (2) the secured creditor is better off in the bank-
ruptcy case (e.g., pursuing a 363 sale free and clear); and (3) the treat-
ment of the secured creditor in the case does not make worse off other 
creditors, interest holders, or parties in interest, then it is proper to vindi-
cate the secured creditor’s interest in the bankruptcy case. Otherwise, 
bankruptcy law would have failed that creditor and failed to achieve its 
proper goals. The guiding principle of a secured creditor bankruptcy is 
that the secured creditor’s position must be improved and the positions 
of other parties in interest must not be worsened. 
Consider the following paradigmatic hypothetical. Debtor’s opera-
tion of its business in Chapter 11 has prevented the entire loss of the 
firm’s going concern value (as would be the case in a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion or secured creditor foreclosure sale). Through a court-approved auc-
tion process, the debtor has entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement 
(“APA”) with a buyer. One of the terms of the APA, insisted upon by 
the buyer, is a 363 sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets free and 
clear of all interests. The buyer intends to continue operation of the 
business, including retention of some of the debtor’s current employees. 
After satisfaction of all administrative expenses, however, the proceeds 
of the sale will be insufficient to permit any distributions to other credi-
tors; all of the net proceeds will be allocated to the secured creditor (as 
would be the case in a Chapter 7 liquidation or foreclosure sale of the as-
sets). 
Under this hypothetical, the secured creditor has recovered more 
that it would in a liquidation or foreclosure, the firm as a going concern 
has been preserved (with all of the related benefits, such as preservation 
of leases and executory contracts, enhanced benefits for the buyer, and 
continued employment), and the other creditors, interest holders, and 
parties in interests are not made worse off. Thus, this secured creditor 
bankruptcy should be permitted. 
That the hypothetical case should be permitted does not mean that 
the debtor and secured creditor are entitled to ride roughshod over the 
Bankruptcy Code in general or Chapter 11 in particular. In the hypothet-
ical, it simply means that the case should not be dismissed or converted 
merely because it is a secured creditor bankruptcy. For example, a 363 
sale in a secured creditor bankruptcy should be required to satisfy the 
                                                                                                                                      
 141. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil 
Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 937–45 (2004). 
 142. Id. at 934 n.4. 
 143. J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 225 (1991).  
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generally applicable judicially adopted requirements for such a sale, in-
cluding a business justification. Providing benefits to a secured creditor 
(or creditors) that would not be available outside of bankruptcy (e.g., 
protection of going concern value) should constitute a business justifica-
tion. Or, perhaps the creditors’ committee believes there is some chance 
for recoveries beyond the secured creditor’s claim. The committee could 
argue that the debtor is not a “melting ice cube,” contrary to the debtor’s 
and secured creditors assertions, and that the assets should be sold pur-
suant to a liquidation plan instead of a 363 sale.144 In a proper case that 
argument might well prevail. 
Consistent with the guiding principle that a secured creditor bank-
ruptcy should make no stakeholder worse off, a 363 sale or plan confir-
mation and consummation in a secured creditor bankruptcy should not 
render the estate administratively insolvent or increase any administra-
tive insolvency that already might exist. The secured creditor to be bene-
fited should bear the expenses or damages to the estate occasioned by 
maintenance of the case for its benefit. 
In order to effect this guiding principle, the secured creditor should 
be permitted—indeed required—to provide carveouts or gifts to other 
parties in interest, so long as the carveout or gift derives from the secured 
creditor’ distributions in the case or is deducted from distributions to 
which the secured creditor(s) otherwise would be entitled. Stated other-
wise, it is the recovery of the secured creditor, and not any other party, 
that should be diminished. These carveouts or gifts could be made, for 
example, in order to cover administrative expenses (including fees and 
expenses of professionals retained by the debtor or committees) or to 
provide distributions to a class or type of creditor that otherwise would 
not be entitled to the distributions. Because such carveouts or gifts would 
derive solely from the entitlements of the secured creditor, the absolute 
priority rule would not be offended even if effected through a plan.145 
In structuring permissible carveouts or gifts, form should not prevail 
over substance. Such arrangements should be permitted, for example, in 
connection with distributions of proceeds of a 363 sale or in connection 
with a confirmed plan of reorganization. If the secured creditor proposes 
to gift a portion of its distribution to another creditor or interest holder 
class wholly outside of the secured creditor bankruptcy, the secured cred-
itor should be required to make full disclosure of such a proposal. 
In a secured creditor bankruptcy the conduct of the secured creditor 
should be held to the same standards as any other party in interest. For 
example, proposed payments or gifting that would otherwise disqualify a 
plan or support designation for voting purposes would not be insulated 
because a case is a secured creditor bankruptcy. The status of a secured 
                                                                                                                                      
 144. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 32, at 942–43 (“If the debtor is not a melting ice cube, the 
proponent will be encouraged to comply with the normal plan process rather than take a shortcut.”). 
 145. See McDivitt, supra note 63, at 1032, 1036–37. 
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creditor bankruptcy as such, however, should not be considered abusive 
of bankruptcy policy per se if it otherwise would not be so characterized 
and assuming the guiding principles are observed. Of course, the lever-
age of a secured creditor in a secured creditor bankruptcy may position it 
favorably to exercise abusive conduct. But, it is the character of the con-
duct measured by neutral standards that should be determinative. 
D. Rebuttals and Surrebuttals 
1. Rebuttal of the Case Against and Surrebuttal of the Case For 
For present purposes, it is fair to assume that bankruptcy, including 
Chapter 11 and its predecessor reorganization and arrangement chapters, 
typically has involved a collective proceeding with numerous creditors 
and stakeholders with differing priorities.146 Certainly, that is the para-
digm that Congress had in mind in providing for the appointment of var-
ious types of committees in Chapter 11.147 As Against asserts, a secured 
creditor bankruptcy inherently is not that type of collective proceeding 
because virtually all of the assets are subject to the secured creditor’s 
senior secured claim. However, For must point out that there is nothing 
in the Bankruptcy Code that clearly disqualifies such a case from being 
maintained. That a secured creditor bankruptcy does not “seem” like the 
“traditional” or “typical”148 “collective proceeding” that some bankrupt-
cy mavens may idolize does not provide a rigorous analytical framework 
for concluding that secured creditor bankruptcies should not be tolerat-
ed. A “no asset” Chapter 7 case also fails to resemble a traditional collec-
tive proceeding. There is no distribution to creditors in such a case be-
cause there are insufficient assets to result in a distribution. In a secured 
creditor bankruptcy there is no distribution to other creditors because 
the secured creditor has a first claim on the assets. 
In response, Against notes that it is quite appropriate to rely on the 
clear legislative purposes of a statute in its interpretation or, when a 
court has been given substantial discretion, in its application. A secured 
creditor’s enforcement of its lien against its collateral diverges substan-
tially from the purposes of a collective proceeding. A bankruptcy court 
may properly take this into account in determining, for example, whether 
to dismiss or convert a case. 
                                                                                                                                      
 146. CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICE 452–53 (3d ed. 2010); Brenda Hacker Osborne, Attorneys’ Fees in Chapter 11 Reorganiza-
tions: A Case for Modified Procedures, 69 IND. L.J. 581, 588 (1994) (“Because bankruptcy is a collec-
tive proceeding, representing the best interests of the estate means taking into consideration the com-
peting interests of multiple parties involved in the bankruptcy.”). 
 147. See generally Peter C. Blain & Diane Harrison O’Gawa, Creditors’ Committees Under Chap-
ter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers, and Duties, 73 MARQ. L. 
REV. 581 (1990). 
 148. Note, however, that some are of the view that secured creditor bankruptcies have become 
“typical” or at least not “unusual.” 
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Against also points out that a secured creditor bankruptcy is the 
functional equivalent of a liquidation that utilizes the advantages of 
Chapter 11 without (often) complying with the plan process. The claim is 
that such a case utilizes Chapter 11 to address a two-party dispute. Re-
sponding, For points to the beneficial wealth enhancement that results 
when a Chapter 11 liquidation captures going concern value when com-
pared to a Chapter 7 liquidation or nonbankruptcy foreclosure sale. It 
should be of no moment for bankruptcy policy that the wealth is en-
hanced for the benefit of the secured creditor.149 It is bankruptcy law that 
mandates that secured claims be respected and bankruptcy law that rec-
ognizes the priority of the secured claim above others.150 Bankruptcy law 
serves to vindicate the rights, inter alia, of creditors and the secured cred-
itor is a creditor.151 In many, perhaps most, cases a secured creditor will 
prefer to take its collateral and run, leaving a debtor’s bankruptcy case 
behind. But, in a secured creditor bankruptcy, the secured creditor 
should be the best judge of the means of recovering the most value from 
the collateral. And if that judgment favors a disposition in Chapter 11, 
that normally should be respected. As to the bypassing of the Chapter 11 
plan process, there is nothing special about a secured creditor bankrupt-
cy. The evolving law on substantial asset 363 sales in Chapter 11 should 
treat such a case no differently from any others. 
Against generally condemns gifting and carveouts as private agree-
ments that amount to an unapproved-by-Congress scheme for selectively 
using the Bankruptcy Code for the secured creditor’s benefit, and, in 
some instances, in a manner that offends the absolute priority rule and 
results in unfair discrimination. The point is that only Congress could au-
thorize such arrangements and that the secured creditor is usurping a 
public good (bankruptcy courts) for private benefit. Again, For reiterates 
that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits or even discourages gift-
ing or carveouts.152 So long as creditors and other parties in interest who 
are not favored by gifting or carveout are no worse off, bankruptcy  
policy—including the absolute priority rule—is respected. For example, 
the reasoning behind the unsecured creditor class cramdown require-
ment that junior classes receive nothing unless the unsecured class is sat-
isfied in full is the logical assumption that if a junior class receives some-
                                                                                                                                      
 149. That the wealth enhancement may indirectly benefit existing and future employees and par-
ties that may continue to do business with the debtor’s successor should be of import for bankruptcy 
policy, however. 
 150. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1997) 
(“A longstanding and basic principle of U.S. bankruptcy law is that a secured creditor is entitled to 
receive the entire amount of its secured claim—the portion of its bankruptcy claim that is backed by 
collateral—before any unsecured claims are paid. This principle of full priority is generally reflected in 
the provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code . . . .”). 
 151. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 152. Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know About Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 445, 445 (2002) (stating that the term “‘carve out’ does not derive its substance from any particular 
section of the Bankruptcy Code.”).  
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thing it necessarily came out of value that should have been distributed to 
the unsecured class.153 When it demonstrably is the case that the value re-
ceived by the junior class is provided by the secured creditor, absolute 
priority is not offended. 
Moreover, in considering the policies embodied in the Bankruptcy 
Code, it is important to keep in mind that absolute priority as established 
by Boyd154 and its progeny155 and under Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy 
Act was abandoned by the enactment of Chapter 11 in favor of what 
might be dubbed “conditional priority.”156 Unlike prior law, under Chap-
ter 11 the requirement of unanimous consent of a senior class to a devia-
tion from absolute priority no longer applies.157 If the requisite majorities 
of a class in amount and number accept a plan, then the minority class 
members are bound and need not be crammed-down and do not retain 
the power to hold out. Only classes (not creditors) that have not accepted 
a plan are entitled to such protection.158 Thus, the notion that a senior 
class (such as the secured creditor in a secured creditor bankruptcy) may 
give away its entitlements in favor of a junior class is not novel and does 
not contravene any fundamental bankruptcy policy. 
As for the argument by Against that a secured creditor bankruptcy 
offends bankruptcy (or any other) policy by employing the bankruptcy 
courts for its private benefit, For responds that the argument either 
proves too much or proves nothing. In our system of civil procedure, fed-
eral and state governments offer the courts to private parties for the vin-
dication and satisfaction of their private entitlements.159 There are rules 
of entry (e.g., jurisdiction and venue rules) and governments possess the 
                                                                                                                                      
 153. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 154. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 507 (1913) (articulating and applying the absolute pri-
ority rule for the first time). See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 1154–55 (discussing Boyd). 
 155. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 119 (1939) (applying the fair and equitable 
test (the absolute priority rule) on a creditor-by-creditor basis). Case was an example of the old Chap-
ter X holdout problem. In Case, the Supreme Court reversed the confirmation of a reorganization plan 
even though it had been approved by more than ninety percent of the creditors. Id. at 132. 
 156. See Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable Standard: How 
the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 45–47 (2012). 
 157. Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 88 (1991) (“The compromise . . . proposed that only classes of creditors could 
invoke the [absolute priority] rule. . . . [T]he compromise sought to overrule the procedural protec-
tions afforded by Case: under the compromise, an individual creditor who had been outvoted could 
not challenge a plan on absolute priority grounds.”). For a brief summary of the history of absolute 
priority and the holdout problem, see Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. 
v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1360–61 (7th Cir. 1990). There, Judge Easterbrook stated: 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 required plans of reorganization to be “fair and equitable” but did 
not define that phrase. It also allowed creditors to consent to plans that impaired their interests, 
but the consent had to be unanimous. The absolute priority rule came into being as a cross be-
tween the interpretation of “fair and equitable” and a rule of contract law. . . . . 
Everything changed with the adoption of the Code in 1978. The definition of “fair and equitable” 
is no longer a matter of common law; § 1129(b)(2) defines it expressly. 
Id. 
 158. See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and 
the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1948 n.47 (2006).  
 159. See Mooney, supra note 141, at 939, 1025. 
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ability to (and do) assess costs on parties for the use of the courts.160 This 
is not merely an observation about our courts, it is the whole point of the 
courts. In a bankruptcy case, the private rights of stakeholders such as 
interest holders and creditors—general unsecured, priority, and se-
cured—are front and center. Their interests are the main point of the 
case. A secured creditor in a secured creditor bankruptcy no more usurps 
a public good for private gain than any other creditor in a bankruptcy 
case or, for that matter, any civil litigant. 
In response, Against calls attention to the contrast between an actu-
al distribution of value to a secured creditor and the creditor’s subse-
quent, voluntary transfer of some of the value to another person outside 
of the bankruptcy process, on the one hand, and the distribution to the 
other person (facially in violation of the absolute priority rule) under a 
plan in the Chapter 11 case, on the other. In the former situation, one can 
take comfort that the actual rules of the road in Chapter 11 have been 
observed, assuming no other impropriety is involved. The latter may de-
pend on ad hoc allocations and valuations that have been less fully test-
ed. 
As to a secured creditor’s use of the bankruptcy courts for its own 
gain, Against would emphasize that it is not the use of a court for private 
gain in general that is objectionable. Instead, the problem is the use of 
the bankruptcy courts, under a statutory framework designed and in-
tended for a collective proceeding, for what is functionally a foreclosure 
sale. 
The point just made relates in part to the complaint by Against that 
secured creditor bankruptcies fail to utilize the more appropriate fora of 
state courts to deal with enforcement of security arrangements that are 
governed by state law. As a result, secured creditor bankruptcies require 
the (federal) bankruptcy courts to deal with and determine issues of state 
law that would be better handled by the state courts. Indeed, Against 
even questions the power of bankruptcy courts to preside over a secured 
creditor bankruptcy. 
The argument that, in the abstract, state courts are better suited to 
handle enforcement of secured transactions ignores the wealth-
enhancement virtues of secured creditor bankruptcies that can capture 
going concern value. Sales free and clear under section 363(f) offer 
greater cleansing power, at least in some jurisdictions.161 A broad inter-
pretation of the “interests” that are cut off in such a sale can serve to en-
                                                                                                                                      
 160. See id. at 979 n.220 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012) (concerning jurisdiction in bankruptcy 
proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012) (establishing venue in bankruptcy cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1409 
(2012) (governing venue of proceedings under, arising in, or related to bankruptcy cases)). 
 161. See Thomas D. Goldberg, On the Edge: New Decisions Protecting Purchasers of Assets Under 
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2003 at 1, 1, available at http://daypitney. 
com/news/docs/dbh/news.3299.pdf (“Section 363(f) permits a bankruptcy court to approve the sale of 
assets ‘free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate.’ This provision 
is highly attractive to purchasers because it ‘cleanses’ the assets, making it more difficult for third par-
ties to assert claims against the assets or the purchaser.”). 
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hance the sales price for the assets. The same can be said of the ability to 
assume and assign leases and executory contracts in a bankruptcy case.162 
As to state courts being better suited, For would emphasize that contract 
and property—generally state law issues—are at the very core of any 
bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy courts deal with these matters every day. 
For rejects the idea that there is a competence gap between the bank-
ruptcy courts and state courts. Indeed, if there is a gap, it is likely to be in 
favor of the competence of the bankruptcy courts because of the fre-
quency with which they deal with issues involving secured claims when 
compared with state courts of general jurisdiction.163 As to the bankrupt-
cy courts’ powers, in a secured creditor bankruptcy there are no unusual 
moves by a bankruptcy court such as surcharging exempt property. 
There is simply a 363 sale free and clear or a liquidating plan of reorgani-
zation or both. 
In response, Against reiterates that the functional equivalent of a 
secured creditor foreclosure is an inappropriate role for a Chapter 11 
case. 
Finally, Against argues that secured creditor bankruptcies are not 
necessary because a sale free and clear can be accomplished under state 
law pursuant to UCC section 9-617.164 As argued above, however, For 
contends that a sale free and clear under section 363(f) may have greater 
cleansing power and one plausibly can rely on the secured creditor to 
choose the approach that will maximize the value of the collateral. Also, 
section 9-617 applies only to personal property and fixtures, not to real 
property, and enforcement against real property, including assigned leas-
es, is far more cumbersome. 
In response, Against notes that if enforcement remedies for real 
property are inadequate then they should be reformed. De facto bank-
ruptcy foreclosure is not the optimal, or even an appropriate, response. 
2. Rebuttal of the Case For and Surrebuttal of the Case Against 
The essence of For’s position is that a secured creditor bankruptcy 
is justified if and when it results in a Pareto improvement—the secured 
creditor is made better off and no one is made worse off.165 As in the go-
ing concern hypothetical posited by For, Against acknowledges that cer-
tainly it is possible for a secured creditor bankruptcy to have such a bene-
ficial result. But this possibility does not, alone, mean that secured 
creditor bankruptcies necessarily reflect good policy.  
                                                                                                                                      
 162. Valuable leases and executor contract can be assumed and assigned under section 365. 11 
U.S.C. § 365(a)–(b), (f) (2012). 
 163. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 164. U.C.C. § 9-617 (2014). 
 165. Economic Definition of Pareto improvement. Defined., ECON. GLOSSARY, http://glossary. 
econguru.com/economic-term/Pareto+improvement (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). 
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Continuing with that hypothetical, Against suggests consideration 
of some additional hypothetical facts. As is typical, the buyer party to the 
APA was a stalking horse bidder and the APA was entered into before 
or early on in the case. The secured creditor and the (cooperative) debt-
or in possession assert that the terms of the APA (including the purchase 
price) are fair. A bidding procedure was established that could allow 
competing bids for the assets, but no competing bids are received. The 
bankruptcy court is confronted with the “melting ice cube” argument and 
consequently faces substantial pressure to approve the procedures, the 
APA, and the 363 sale. The court does so. 
But what if this is not a secured creditor bankruptcy because the 
debtor is not a melting ice cube? Consistent with that, Against asks 
whether a substantially greater sales price could be negotiated by slowing 
the process and conducting a sale under a confirmed plan of reorganiza-
tion? In the typical case of an early 363 sale, those possibilities will never 
be explored fully. Perhaps the central problem here is the power of a 
dominant secured creditor that asserts that there is a melting ice cube 
and no possibility of recoveries for the unsecured creditors coupled with 
a bankruptcy court that is unwilling to roll the dice by delaying the pro-
cess. This may be exacerbated by the difficulties objecting creditors 
would face in blocking the sale or forcing a renegotiation. In this connec-
tion, a recent empirical study provides strong evidence that 363 sales 
fetch considerably smaller sales prices than sales under plans.166 The au-
thors demonstrate that the principal cause of the discounted prices in 363 
sales is not the speed with which they are conducted early on in cases, 
but instead the creditors’ lack of sufficient leverage when compared to 
plan sales involving mandatory disclosure and creditor acceptances of a 
plan.167 
In response, For would note that the foregoing does not support the 
position of Against, which in the hypothetical would advocate dismissal 
or conversion and would not permit gifting in support of administrative 
expenses. The real point to be made here, perhaps, is that courts should 
be wary of substantial asset 363 sales. The recent study discussed above 
did not focus on secured creditor bankruptcies, however. If the secured 
creditor truly is under-secured, then absent collusion or self-dealing, the 
secured creditor would have incentives to seek the highest possible sales 
price. There would be no need, then, for the leverage of unsecured credi-
tors in the plan process inasmuch as the secured creditor would already 
have an incentive to maximize its recovery. 
                                                                                                                                      
 166. Anne M. Anderson & Yung-Yu Ma, Acquisitions in Bankruptcy: 363 Sales Versus Plan Sales 
and the Existence of Fire Sales, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 13–17 (2014). 
 167. Id. at 3, 15–17. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Against and For have had their say. Now it is my turn. 
My conclusion is that the absolute bar on secured creditor bank-
ruptcies advocated by Against is untenable. Secured creditor bankrupt-
cies can preserve wealth in the form of going concern value and other-
wise maximize recoveries for the beneficiary secured creditor, while 
imposing all costs of that preservation on the secured creditor and re-
specting the most important principles underlying Chapter 11. But se-
cured creditor bankruptcies should be permitted only subject to carefully 
drawn limitations, as advocated by For. 
Secured creditor bankruptcies have the potential to work great mis-
chief by removing (in large part) various adversarial aspects of the Chap-
ter 11 process. Courts have been and should be cautious about any sub-
stantial asset 363 sale early on in a case. Courts should be alert for 
potential abuses of the process. But the prohibition of all secured credi-
tor bankruptcies based solely on the potential for abuse seems wholly 
unwarranted. Let us hope that through the developing case law courts 
will be up to the task of allowing bankruptcy law to realize its proper 
goals. 
